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The experimental evidence presented in chapters 2 to 5 has basically confirmed our initial hypothesis that both states and contents of consciousness do covary with certain spatiotemporal configurations of the electromagnetic field. This makes it worthwhile to generate and examine a slightly more fleshed-out version of the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness.
We may begin by restating the basic tenet of the theory, which is that conscious experience is a fundamental property of certain configurations of the electromagnetic field.
It is important to note that the word fundamental is here taken as meaning "not able to be reduced or explained in terms of anything simpler" - there is no implication that a fundamental property of the electromagnetic field is a uniform property of the field. The present proposal specifically does not imply that all parts of the electromagnetic field are conscious at all times, which would entail some form of panpsychism. Rather, it is proposed that consciousness, like light and matter, is non-uniformly distributed in space and time. In one sense, since various spots in the field are conscious at various times, the field as a whole can be regarded as having the property of consciousness (in the same way as a cloth with red spots on it can be regarded as having the property of redness). However in another and very important sense, consciousness is localized. A given spatial location in the field can be magnificently conscious at some times, partially conscious at other times and not conscious at all for most of the time. In other words, the hypothesis allows for the ability of consciousness to move about in space with its biological associates and to fluctuate in intensity, as in different levels of anesthesia or sleep.
The electromagnetic field theory of consciousness also allows for the existence of different types of consciousness. The consciousness of humans probably differs from the consciousness of that famous philosopher's familiar the bat, for example (Nagel, 1974 [207]) and the present theory in principle explains why: because the spatiotemporal electromagnetic field-configurations generated by bat brains differ from those generated by human brains. Likewise, the different qualia experienced by any particular human subject are different: hearing is different from vision and both are different from smell. The electromagnetic field theory of consciousness predicts or explains this also: the spatiotemporal electromagnetic field configurations generated by the auditory cortex differ from those generated by the visual cortex and the field configurations generated by the olfactory system differ from both. Different sensory experiences within one sensory modality also differ. For example, the experience of hearing a 500 Hz sound differs from the experience of hearing a 1000 Hz sound. The theory explains this as being due to the fact that the spatial electromagnetic field configuration generated by the auditory cortex in response to a 500 Hz pressure wave in the ambient air is different from that generated in response to a 1000 Hz wave. The reader will have noticed that all of these statements about how the theory explains various differences in consciousness concern measurable differences in the spatiotemporal electromagnetic field configurations that are generated by brains in various situations. They are all supported by extensive existing empirical evidence, as documented in Chapters 3 to 5 of this book (except, it must be admitted, the part about the bat - there do exist extensive data on the field-configurations generated by bat brains, but in the interests of brevity I have chosen not to document them here).
One previously intractable question which is easily answered by the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness is why only some of the neural activity that goes on in brains enters consciousness. On the present theory we are not required to postulate that some specialised neurons possess a kind of magical consciousness-stuff that has so far not been identified, which seems to be the only way out of the dilemma if one concentrates on single neurons. The explanation offered by the present theory is simply that only some configurations of the electromagnetic field have the property of consciousness. The important thing is not individual neurons, but the spatiotemporal pattern of neural firing over large groups of neurons, which does generate a conscious field-configuration in some circumstances and does not in others. At this stage the precise spatiotemporal features that are the signature of a conscious, as opposed to an unconscious field-configuration are still to be determined, but this question would appear to be eminently accessible experimentally.
Another previously knotty problem which is essentially dissolved by the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness is the question of why conscious experience has an apparent unity to it. We know that when we perceive a visual scene for example, the neurons that fire in response to various aspects of the scene (color, movement, form) are located in fairly widely separated areas of the brain. Yet our overall perception of the scene seems to occur all at once, in a completely integrated way. In fact on the basis of its Latin derivation, the word consciousness can be taken as meaning "knowing things together" or "all at once". This feature of consciousness has in the past been baffling because it has been implicitly assumed that there must be a single place in the brain where all information has to converges in order to give rise to a conscious experience. The fact that it would take a finite amount of time for information to get to this hypothetical place from all the various regions of the brain where it was constructed is thus upsetting and has led to the proposal of various rather uncomfortable solutions. Several commentators have even suggested that quantum non-locality must have something to do with mind, although they are generally not very specific about what (Hodgson, 1991).
On the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness, however, no such extreme solutions are necessary. The visual experience of any given moment in time is simply the whole pattern in the electromagnetic field that exists as a result the activity of all the parts of the brain occupied with processing vision at that moment. On this interpretation, one spatial part of the electromagnetic pattern in the brain is the conscious experience of the color red occupying a particular region of space in the world, another spatial part of the electromagnetic pattern in the brain is the conscious experience of a balloon-shaped object occupying the same region of space in the world and a third spatial pattern in the brain is the experience of movement in that region of space in the world. When all of these parts of the electromagnetic pattern in the brain are present at a particular moment in time, the conscious perception of the moment is that a red balloon is floating through that part of the world. If the movement part of the pattern is missing, the balloon stays still. If the red part of the pattern changes to a yellow pattern, the balloon changes color. And so on.
So on this theory, the conscious mind of an individual is the sum total of all the conscious field-configurations that are spatially coincident with the individual's brain. Any conscious field-configurations existing in your brain at a given moment are automatically part of your experience at that moment. The binding problem simply does not arise.
For the present articulation of the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness then, there is no "binding problem". The only problem is working out from empirical observations exactly what rules relate various parts of the brain-generated electromagnetic pattern to various factors in the perceptual experience. This is by no means a trivial problem technically, but it is at least a relatively easy one conceptually.
The theory about the nature of consciousness which has probably always been held (though never spoken) by the majority of working cellular neuroscientists has most recently been articulated by Francis Crick, in his book The Astonishing Hypothesis (Crick, 1994 [65]). As Crick puts it:
"The Astonishing Hypothesis is that `You', your joys and your sorrows, your memories and your ambitions, your sense of personal identity and free will, are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules. As Lewis Carroll's Alice might have phrased it: `You're nothing but a pack of neurons."'
In fact this hypothesis has been around in print for at least 30 years (Fiegl, 1967 [87]) and the conceptual difficulties that make it astonishing were well discussed by Gordon Globus a little over 25 years ago (Globus, 1973 [114]). The idea is generally known as the psychoneural identity theory, because it essentially holds that consciousness is identical with the firing of neurons.
The electromagnetic field theory of consciousness has some similarities with the psychoneural identity theory, in that the electromagnetic patterns postulated to be identical with consciousness in the electromagnetic field theory are at present only generated by the coordinated firing of neurons. However the two theories are sharply differentiated by one obvious feature. This is that, if we knew enough about the spatiotemporal characteristics of the field-patterns proposed by the present theory to be conscious, it would in principle be possible to generate them in the total absence of neurons.
This suggests an obvious experimental test of the present theory. If we could describe in enough detail the spatial electromagnetic pattern that covaries with the sound of middle C, for example, we could in principle use hardware (instead of wetware) to generate a little lump of middle-C-experience in one corner of the room. The difficulty with this test would of course be deciding whether the field patterns so generated were indeed conscious, since they would exist in total isolation and would not have the benefit of being associated with a language or other behavioral system that would allow either reportage of or inference about their subjective character. Even if they could be provided with such a system, the entity in question would be likely to encounter the sort of speciesist prejudice that initially bothered the fictional Mr Data of Star Trek fame - some possessors of a wetware brain would simply refuse to believe the report of a hardware-instantiated being concerning its private subjective experiences.
However this problem of verifying the subjective quality of an artificial middle-C quale might conceivably be overcome by the positioning of a biological brain in the same location as the artificially generated electromagnetic patterns. It is a reasonable prediction that the artificial conscious experience might then be integrated into the consciousness generated by the biological brain and thus experienced by the "I" associated with that brain. Success of this prediction would have a number of consequences that could turn out to be of some importance for human society.
1. One consequence of successful generation of conscious field-configurations in the absence of biological neurons is that genuinely conscious computers could become a reality. The hardware of such entities would have to be organized along entirely different lines from that of the current generation of computers, because in order to generate conscious experiences it would have to generate complex spatiotemporal electromagnetic patterns, rather than linear strings of digital bits and bytes. But in principle these entities could eventually possess all of the relevant characteristics that define a human person. Therefore ethically, they would have to be granted similar rights to humans. This would no doubt include the right not to be turned off. Such beings would have one characteristic that would distinguish them from humans however and that is the potential for what would be essentially immortality. Human bodies wear out after a mere century or so, but silicon (or whatever material is eventually used) can keep its configuration for thousands of years. So these conscious beings would have the potential to become immensely old and wise. They would also have the potential to possess senses that humans do not have. In principle their makers could copy the senses of sonar-using species such as bats and dolphins, or could provide the ability for their creations to navigate by detecting magnetic variations like pigeons or to detect minute levels of chemicals in the environment like insects. Completely new kinds of sensory consciousness could also be invented, capable of detecting environmental radiation outside the light range. Creatures possessing such characteristics would certainly make interesting friends and acquaintances.
2. A second consequence which would follow from the successful generation of conscious experiences in the absence of neurons would be a complete reconstruction of the education and entertainment industries. If it did turn out to be possible to generate a little disembodied lump of conscious experience in the air and have it integrate it into a biological consciousness simply by placing the head in the right place in the field, then movies as we know them would rapidly become so old-hat as to be merely a historical curiosity. They would be replaced by complete experiences, including not just sight and sound but all the other sensory modalities and emotions as well. Virtual reality would be an order of magnitude more real than it currently is. Learning could become completely experiential, virtual tourism might relieve summer congestion at the world's beauty spots and the present illicit pharmaceuticals industry would no doubt find itself seriously undermined.
3. A third practical consequence of the ability to generate conscious experiences non-biologically and have these integrate into a biological consciousness would be the possibility of generating artificial sensory experience for the blind or deaf, for example. It might also be possible to generate inverse electromagnetic field configurations to cancel out unwanted biologically-generated experiences like chronic pain.
In short, if this theory and its predictions turn out to be right, we are looking at nothing less than a major revolution in the way we live.
But will the theory and its predictions turn out to be right? The only way to find out for sure is to measure some sensory patterns, generate them artificially and shove someone's head into the artificial patterns. However before we go to such a considerable amount of trouble, we can certainly take a further look at the current situation with regard to the verifiability of the theory.
According to Popper, it is not possible to prove a scientific theory - the best that can be done is to fail to disprove it. The failure of some attempts to disprove the present theory will be described in Chapter 8. However, whatever the excellence of Popper's dictum in a logical sense, the sociology of science dictates that what actually causes a theory eventually to be accepted is not repeated failure to disprove it, but the existence of a large body of positive evidence supporting it. Positive evidence that so far exists to support the electromagnetic field theory of consciousness can be summarised as follows: